Abstract-Due to the constraints on available resources, a node in wireless sensor networks is likely to be selfish and refuse to declare itself as a cluster head. Based on game theory, this paper models the problem and discusses the condition of Nash Equilibrium. Simulation results show that nodes have tendency to cooperate due to the reduction in delay and loss rate.
INTRODUCTION
In wireless sensor networks (WSNs) [1] , sensor nodes pass data through the network to a base station and announce to the users. We usually assumed that all nodes are cooperative and are willing to provide network services such as relaying data for others. However, this assumption is not strictly true in WSNs. Unlike traditional networks, sensor nodes in WSNs are limited in power, computational capacities, and memory. For some rational sensor nodes, they fix attention on saving their own resources and refuse to provide any service without their own interest for others. Such nodes are described as selfish nodes. Simulation based studies [2] show that even a small percentage (10-40%) of selfish nodes can bring the network throughput considerably down (16-32% degradation) .
Specifically, clustering is widely adopted in WSNs, which divides the network into clusters and sets cluster heads (CHs) responsible for data fusion. It has the advantages of low energy consumption, simple routing scheme and good scalability. For the nodes that serve as CHs, their energy and resource consumption are normally faster than its member nodes due to the long-distance communication to the sink. Therefore a selfish node would refuse to declare itself as a CH.
To solve the problem, game theory [3] is adopted. The mechanism designs a game such that selfish behavior of the nodes induces a predictable strategy profile, and the output function for this predicted strategy corresponds to a Nash Equilibrium outcome. Namely, no node has an incentive to unilaterally deviate from this dominant strategy.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Related work is discussed in section 2. In Section 3 we address CH election on the basis of game theory. Performance evaluation is given in Section 4 and Section 5 concludes this paper.
II. RELATED WORK
Clustering in wireless sensor networks is a hot topic. Various well known clustering routing protocol have been proposed, such as LEACH [5] and PEGASIS [6] . Energy consumption and communication latency are reduced, however, many assumptions do exist in such approaches. For example, nodes should have much information about other nodes, which is not practical in reality. Besides, most clustering protocols do not consider the selfishness of nodes.
Various game-theoretic models have been adopted to deal with the selfishness of nodes. Reference [7] focuses on the nodes' energy reporting strategy, but fails to analysis other cooperating behaviors of the nodes. Reference [8] provides a utility function to stimulate cooperate and study Nash Equilibrium theoretically. However, simulation remains to be implemented. Reference [9] solves the problem of uneven energy consumption as a sort of static game with so-called confidence probability. It depends on central control, which makes it not suitable for distributed autonomous environment. The balance of payment and cost is also hard to keep.
Reference [10] proposes a repeated-game model based on local detection and punishment mechanism of isolation, which takes account of the selfish nodes' future payoff expectations and their long-term desires for payoff. However, the proposed model is not suitable for WSNs as sensors nodes have constraint on energy. Reference [11] designs a payoff function on path reliability and energy consumption. Using the punishment mechanism the repeated game model can propel a Nash Equilibrium and decrease the defection possibility of selfish nodes. But it fails to consider effect of the distance between nodes on energy consumption. Reference [12] defines a Trust Degree and Most Trustworthy Path (MTP) in consideration of the basic trust elements in WSNs such as security, energy constraint and routing reliability. An incentive and punishment scheme is proposed to resolve selfish nodes.
Moreover, [13] aims at solving the problem of retaliation situations after a node falsely perceived as selfish to help restore cooperation quickly. This scheme is collusionresistant and can achieve full cooperation among nodes. However, it is based on the assumption that nodes share perceived dropping probability with each other truthfully. Reference [14] combines a modified version of existed routing protocol with coalitional game theory in order to find the cheapest route in a group with respect to power consumption. How to choose corresponding leaders is not mentioned though. It just focuses on logic rewriting of the algorithm. Reference [15] determines the route with least energy consumption and maximum cooperation among nodes via a game-theoretic approach. According to the payoff matrix, nodes are encouraged to participate with their best possible action.
III. GAME-THEORETIC CLUSTERING MECHANISM

A. Relevant models
We assume that the network is composed of N sensor nodes. They are uniformly dispersed within a circle field and continuously monitor their surrounding environment, as is shown in Fig.1 . We also assume that one sink locates far away from the sensing region and receives data delivered by all the cluster heads. Moreover, the sink is mobile and changes its position in circle that ensures its average distance from every node is the same in a relative long-term run. Such setting reduces the energy hole problem to some extent. We make the following assumptions:
(1)All nodes are homogeneous and stationary after deployment.
(2)The multiple sink nodes are pre-located within the sensing field randomly.
(3) Nodes can adjust their transmission power according to the relative distance to receiver (4)Links are symmetric. We use similar energy model in [16] . Based on the distance between transmitter and receiver, a free space ( Each sensor node will consume the following Tx E amount of energy to transmit a l-bits packet over distance d, where the elec E is the energy dissipated per bit to run the transmitter or receiver circuit, fs H and mp H represent the transmitter amplifier's efficiency and channel conditions: 
To receive a packet, radio consumes energy:
Cluster heads aggregate n l -bits data packets received from their members into a single l -bits fixed packet. The energy consumption is calculated as follows, where DA E is the data aggregation cost of a bit per signal: ( , ) aggr DA E n l nlE
B. Selection of Cluster Heads
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In our study, the entire network is divided into K equal clusters, as is shown in Fig.2 where 5 K . Each cluster has one cluster head for data aggregation. Instead of direct communication with the sink, each member node in one cluster sends data to its CH. Each CH receives the delivered data, makes aggregation and finally sends data to the sink far away. Such clustering method reduces the traffic load. Moreover, CHs locate in a more uniform way than the probabilistic deployed situation in LEACH. It prolongs the network lifetime and reduces the energy hole problem.
The selection of CHs is important. If a CH runs out of energy, all collected data in its cluster get lost and can no longer reach the sink. Therefore, we have the residual energy of a node stand out as a metric. Any node with the maximum residual energy in a cluster is chosen as a CH. With CH roles change periodically, the network can survive for long time. 
C. Game-theoretic Model for CH Selection
Since each cluster head consumes much energy and takes responsibility of sending data for cluster members, in the fact selfish nodes may refuse to declare itself as the CH. They may tell lies about the value of its residual energy to avoid being selected. Hence the CH selection would fail to work. To solve the problem, we regard the CH declaration as a Role of cluster heads changes periodically. In the long term, D c and RD c can be regarded as constants for simplicity. Moreover, as the sink locates far away from the sensing region, the cost for delivering data to the sink is much larger than that to its CH according to the energy model, namely According to the assumption, all nodes are homogeneous. So it is impossible for each node to find a best response to the strategy choices of its opponents. Namely no purestrategy Nash Equilibrium exists in our game. However, if we assume that each player is allowed to choose its strategy randomly following a probability distribution, a mixedstrategy Nash Equilibrium can be found.
For each node, the possibility of declaring itself as CH (i.e. playing D ) is set as p , and the probability of refusing to declare (i.e. Once the probability p is properly set, a mixed-strategy Nash Equilibrium exists. In this case, with p predetermined for all nodes, each node has a natural incentive to cooperate and make declaration as a CH.
For an arbitrary node, calculate its average utility of a node U , we have
At the mix-strategy Nash Equilibrium, by substituting p from (7), we have
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
Simulate a wireless sensor network using NS2. We have sensor nodes uniformly distributed in a square region and the sink located far away, as it is shown in Fig.3 . Here, we have a simulation time of 60 seconds. And for simplicity, we can study one of the clusters. The proposed payoff for a CH is represented as a later priority in data delivery. For example, when a member node A and another node B both send data to the sink via their current cluster head at certain time, if A used to be the CH, we have A send its data first and let B wait for a while till it gets turns to transmit its data. Fig.4 and Fig.5 shows the changes in the aspect of delay and loss rate for a node that is once chosen as the cluster head respectively. We assume that it is selfish and refuses to be CH from the beginning but changes to cooperate during the 10th to 15th second. From the figures, It y, g is obvious that our game-theoretic mechanism can result in a reduction the transmission delay for data and provide a relative lower data loss rate. Therefore, it becomes a rational choice for a node to deviate from selfishness. Clustering is an efficient method in wireless sensor networks. Essential operations in clustering include the selection of CHs, which have much responsibility for data delivery. However, due to their limited resources, nodes have selfishness which may affect the efficiency of clustering. In this paper, game theory is adopted to encourage nodes to serve as a CH. Simulation results prove that our gametheoretic mechanism provides good performance.
